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Abstract
Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic
games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, com-
plex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games,
and the equilibria of these complex games can be defined recursively from
the equilibria of their simpler subgames. This paper extends the model by
providing a final coalgebra semantics for infinite games. In the course of this,
we introduce a new operator on games to model the economic concept of
subgame perfection.
Keywords: Compositional game theory; Final coalgebra semantics; Infinite
iterated games; subgame perfection.
1. Introduction
Compositionality, where one sees complex systems as being built from
smaller subsystems, is widely regarded within computer science as best prac-
tice. As the subsystems are smaller, they are easier to reason about, and
compositionality also promotes modularity and reuse; a particular system
can be a subsystem of many different supersystems. Can compositionality
be applied also to economic games? In general, not all reasoning is com-
positional, especially if significant emergent behaviour is present in a large
system but not in its subsystems. This is unfortunately the case for economic
games. For example, if σ is an optimal strategy for G, then is σ part of an
optimal strategy for G∗H , where G∗H is a super-game built from G and H?
Clearly not, e.g. the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma has equilibria — such as
cooperative equilibria — that do not arise from repeatedly playing the Nash
equilibrium from the Prisoners’ Dilemma (Axelrod and Dion, 1988).
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However, Ghani et al. (2016) produced a compositional model of game
theory which included a limited set of operators for building new games from
old. There was no operator to compositionally build the infinite prisoners’
dilemma from the one-shot prisoners dilemma and, more generally, to com-
positionally build infinite iterations of games. This paper addresses that
problem. Within programming language theory, these sort of issues are tack-
led by final coalgebra semantics (Rutten and Turi, 1994) and we follow this
practice, with the added benefit of bringing related bisimulation techniques
to the game theory community. In doing this, we deal with a number of
issues:
• Each round of an infinite game produces utility. Traditionally, this
infinite sequence of staged utilities is combined into a single utility in
one of a number of ad hoc manners. We take the bolder approach of
not requiring the choice of a single mechanism for combining utilities.
• The general approach of Compositional Game Theory deals with a
new concept of coutility: if utility is gained by one agent, it must come
from another agent. However, this produces problems for modelling
infinite games, and so we make a simplifying assumption with respect
to coutility. This is not a limitation in practice, as standard treatments
do not consider coutility.
• The coalgebraic approach we advocate dovetails well with the economic
concept of subgame perfection where a strategy must be an optimal
response in all subgames of the supergame (Shubik, 1984).
Related Work. An introduction to the economic treatment of iterated games
can be found in Mailath and Samuelson (2006). The fundamental concept
of game theory is that of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951), which has been
adapted for the study of repeated and dynamic games to the concept of sub-
game perfect equilibrium first introduced by Selten (1965). Significantly influ-
ential work on using logical methods and coalgebraic reasoning in economics
include Lescanne (2012) and Abramsky and Winschel (2017). Open games
are also closely related to the ‘partially defined games’ of Oliva and Powell
(2015).
Structure of the paper. Section 2 consists of preliminaries and a summary of
previous work on open games; Section 3 introduces a modality for dealing
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with subgame perfection; Section 4 introduces morphisms between games,
and Section 5 consists of our final coalgebra semantics for infinite open
games. Finally Section 6 contains concluding remarks and discussions of
further work.
2. Preliminaries
The key concept of Ghani et al. (2016) is the following:
Definition 1 (Open Game). Let X , Y , R and S be sets. An open game
G = (ΣG , PG , CG, EG) : (X,S)→ (Y,R) consists of:
• a set ΣG of strategy profiles,
• a play function PG : ΣG → (X → Y ),
• a coutility function CG : ΣG → (X × R→ S), and
• an equilibrium function EG : X × (Y → R)→ PΣG .
We sometimes write G : (X,S)
Σ
−→ (Y,R) to make the set of strategies explicit.
Intuitively, the set X contains the states of the game, Y the moves, R the
utilities and S the coutilities. The set ΣG contains the strategies we are
trying to pick an optimal one from. The play function PG selects a move
given a strategy and a state, while the coutility function CG computes the
coutility extruded from the game, given a strategy, state and utility. Finally,
if σ ∈ EG x k, then σ is an optimal strategy in state x and with utility given
by k : Y → R. The main result of Ghani et al. (2016) can be stated as
follows:
Theorem 2. The collection of pairs of sets, with open games G : (X,S) →
(Y,R) as morphisms, forms a symmetric monoidal category Open.1
Proof. The composition of G and H is given by the game with strategies
ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH, play function the composition of the respective play func-
tions from H and G, and coutility function the composition in reverse of the
coutility functions from H and G, using the play function of G to produce
1Actually, one needs to quotient by the equivalence relation induced by isomorphism
of strategies but we simplify presentation here by dealing with representatives directly.
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a state for H. Finally (σ1, σ2) ∈ EH◦G x k if and only if σ1 ∈ EG x k
′, where
k′ y = CH σ2 y (k (PH σ2 y)), and σ2 ∈ EH (PG σ
′ x) k for all σ′ ∈ ΣG .
The monoidal product is given by Cartesian product in the category of
sets, with componentwise action on the strategies, play functions and coutil-
ity functions of open games, and (σ1, σ2) ∈ EG⊗H (x1, x2) k if and only if
σ1 ∈ EG x1 ((π1 ◦ k)( , PH σ2 x2)) and σ2 ∈ EH x2 ((π2 ◦ k)(PG σ1 x1, )). The
unit of this monoidal structure is (1, 1), while the symmetry is inherited from
the Cartesian product in Set.
3. Subgame-Perfection and Conditioning
Intuitively, we play two rounds of a game by composing the game with
itself. However, this is not quite right: in the composite game ΣH◦G =
ΣH × ΣG , and thus the second game H cannot react to the moves played
by the first game G. This clearly does not match practice. Rather than
introduce a new form of composition, we introduce a modality which allows
us to condition a game to react to every possibility in some set A.
Definition 3. Let A be a set. Given a game H : (X, S)
Σ
−→ (Y,R), we define
the game A→ H : (A×X, S)
A→Σ
−−−→ (A× Y, R) by
• the play function PA→H (a, x) (f : A→ ΣH) = (a, PH x (fa))
• the coutility function CA→H (a, x) f r = CH x (fa) r
• the equilibrium function
f ∈ EA→H(a, x) (k : A× Y → R) iff (∀a
′ ∈ A) fa′ ∈ EH x k(a
′, )
Note how a strategy in A→H is a set of strategies, one for each element
of A, and that for a strategy f to be optimal in A → H, each of its compo-
nents must be optimal in H. This captures the notion of subgame-perfection.
Clearly we have:
Lemma 4. The mappings (X,S) 7→ (A ×X,S) and H 7→ A → H define a
functor A→ : Open → Open.
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4. 2-Cells and Coutility Free Games
Fundamentally, if we have a game G : (X,S)
Σ
−→ (Y,R), its infinite it-
eration Gω will be constructed compositionally as the final coalgebra of the
functor FG defined by H 7→ (Y → H) ◦ G. However, this means that games
will acquire universal properties and thus we need a notion of morphism be-
tween games. Further, Gω will satisfy Gω ∼= (Y → Gω) ◦ G, and hence the
equation
CGω xσ r = CG xσ0 (CGω x
′ σ1 r)
relating coutility of Gω and coutility of G must hold. Here, the strategy σ for
Gω decomposes into σ0 for the first round and σ1 for later rounds, and x
′ is
the state after the first round is completed. This equation does not always
have a unique solution — for instance if CG xσ r = r. Hence, to recover
uniqueness, we restrict to games G where CG xσ r = r in this paper. This is
not a great restriction as in standard game theory there is no coutility. For
the sake of presentation, we will also only consider state free games. Next, for
FG to type check, the type of utility and coutility of G must be the same, and
thus we fix some set R and only consider games whose utility and coutility is
R. To summarise, in this paper we consider open games G : (1, R)
Σ
−→ (Y,R)
with state 1, utility and coutility the set R, and coutility function C σ r = r.
We define morphisms between such games as follows:
Definition 5. Let R be a set. Given two games G : (1, R)
Σ
−→ (Y,R) and
G ′ : (1, R)
Σ′
−→ (Y ′, R), a morphism α : G → G ′ consists of a pair of functions
α = (αY : Y → Y
′, αΣ : Σ→ Σ
′) such that
(i) αY (P σ) = P
′ (αΣ σ), and
(ii) for every σ ∈ Σ and k : Y ′ → R, if σ ∈ E (k ◦ αY ) then αΣ(σ) ∈ E
′ k.
We trust the reader will not be confused by the fact that games are
morphisms in Open but also have morphisms between them — this simply
reflects inherent 2-categorical structure. The category whose objects are
open games G : (1, R)
Σ
−→ (Y,R) for some Σ, Y (and a fixed R), and whose
morphisms are the morphisms between such open games is denoted 2OpenR.
We are now in position to define the functor FG : 2OpenR → 2OpenR whose
final coalgebra will be the infinite iteration of the game G.
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Theorem 6. Let R be a set and G : (1, R)
Σ
−→ (Y,R). The mapping FGH =
(Y → H) ◦ G defines a functor FG : 2OpenR → 2OpenR.
Proof. Given a morphism α : H → H′, we define FG(α) : FGH → FGH
′ by
(FG(α))Σ (σ, f) = (σ, αΣ ◦ f) (FG(α))Y (y, z) = (y, αY z)
The play function and equilibrium preservation conditions are easily checked.
5. The iterated game as a final coalgebra
From now on, let R be an arbitrary set, used as utility and coutility for
all our games, and write 2Open for 2OpenR.
5.1. Definition of the iterated game
Let us fix an arbitrary open game G : (1, R)
Σ
−→ (Y,R) that we want to iter-
ate infinitely often via the final coalgebra of the functor FG : 2Open → 2Open
from the previous section, mapping H : (1, R)
ΣH−−→ (YH, R) to (Y →H) ◦ G :
(1, R)
Σ×(Y→ΣH)
−−−−−−−→ (Y ×YH, R). We first describe FG-coalgebras, then our can-
didate Gω for the final FG-coalgebra, and conclude with a proof that Gω really
is final. As a first step we need to recall two endofunctors on the category of
sets and their final coalgebras.
Fact 7. Given two sets I and O we let D(I, O) : Set → Set be the functor
given by D(I, O)X := O × XI and by D(I, O)(f : X → Y ) := idO × f
I .
Furthermore, for a set Y , we define the functor S(Y ) : Set → Set by putting
S(Y )X = Y × X and S(Y )(f : X → Y ) := idY × f . The final D(I, O)-
coalgebra is
(I∗ → O)
〈now,ltr〉
// O × (I∗ → O)I
where now(f) := f(ǫ) and ltr(f) = λi.λw.f(iw) (cf. Rutten (2000, Ex. 9.5)2).
The final S(Y )-coalgebra is
Y ω
〈hd,tl〉
// Y × Y ω
2Loc.cit. proves this for I = 2 but the argument can be easily adapted for arbitrary I.
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where Y ω is the set of infinite streams over Y , hd(y0y1 . . . ) := y0, i.e., hd
maps a stream to its first element (its “head”) and tl(y0y1y2 . . . ) := y1y2 . . . ,
i.e., tl maps a stream to its tail (cf. Rutten (2000, Ex. 9.4)).
The above final coalgebras are fundamental for our representation of it-
erated games: The final S(Y )-coalgebra consists of all infinite sequences
of moves of the one-round game, while the final D(Y,Σ)-coalgebra repre-
sents the set of strategies that map lists of moves — representing moves
chosen in previous rounds — to a strategy for the next round. As nota-
tion, for σ : Y ∗ → Σ we abbreviate now(σ) to σ0, ltr(σ) to σ
′, and use
(::) : Y × Y ω → Y ω to denote the cons-operator on lists. Let us now define
the ω-iteration of G.
Definition 8. The ω-iteration Gω : (1, R) → (Y
ω, R) of G : (1, R) → (Y,R)
has strategies ΣGω given by ΣGω := Y
∗ → ΣG , and play function PGω given
by
PGωσ = PGσ0 :: PGω(λz.σ(PGσ0 :: z))
To define the equilibrium function EGω : (Y
ω → R) → PΣGω , we first define
an operator Φ : (PΣGω)
(Y ω→R) → (PΣGω)
(Y ω→R) by putting
σ ∈ ΦΓ k if σ0 ∈ EG(λy.k(y :: PGω(σ
′y)))
and ∀y′ ∈ Y. σ′y′ ∈ Γ(λz.k(y′ :: z))
Clearly (PΣGω)
(Y ω→R) forms a complete lattice by lifting the complete lat-
tice structure of PΣGω pointwise to the function space. Furthermore, Φ is
obviously a monotone operator on that complete lattice and therefore has a
smallest and a greatest fixpoint. We define EGω to be the greatest fixpoint
of Φ.
Notice that the above approach means we do not have to fix a particular
utility function Y ω → R in advance by some arbitrary form of discounting,
but rather work with all possible utility functions, allowing the user maximum
flexibility.
Lemma 9. Let σ ∈ ΣGω . Then
(i) for all utility functions k : Y ω → R we have σ ∈ EGω(k) if and only if
σ ∈ Φ(EGω)(k), and
(ii) for every Γ ∈ (PΣGω)
(Y ω→R), if Γ ≤ Φ(Γ) then also Γ ≤ EGω .
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Here ≤ denotes the order on (PΣGω)
(Y ω→R) given by Γ ≤ ∆ if Γ(k) ⊆ ∆(k)
for all k : Y ω → R.
Proof. The first item follows since EGω is a fixpoint of Φ, the second because
it is the greatest such, thus also the greatest post-fixpoint wrt the order
≤.
5.2. Proof of finality
In this section we are going to show that Gω is a final coalgebra of the
functor FG = (Y → ) ◦ G : 2Open → 2Open. We have two things to show:
(i) Gω is an FG-coalgebra, and
(ii) for any other FG-coalgebra γ : H → FGH, there exists a unique FG-
coalgebra morphism (unfΣ, unfY ) : H → Gω.
The first item is formulated in the following proposition — its straight-
forward proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 10. The ω-iteration Gω of G is an FG-coalgebra with coalgebra
map α = (〈now, ltr〉 , 〈hd, tl〉) : Gω → FGGω.
We are now ready to prove that Gω indeed is the final FG-coalgebra.
To this end we consider an arbitrary FG-coalgebra H with coalgebra map
(〈nowH, ltrH〉 , 〈hdH, tlH〉). We have to prove that there is a morphism 〈unfΣ, unfY 〉 :
H → Gω such that the following diagram commutes:
FGH
FG(unfΣ,unfY )
//❴❴❴❴❴❴ FGGω
H
(〈nowH,ltrH〉,〈hdH,tlH〉)
OO
(unfΣ,unfY )
//❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ Gω
(〈now,ltr〉,〈hd,tl〉)
OO
It is easy to see that such a FG-coalgebra morphism — if it exists — must be
unique because commutativity of the above diagram implies commutativity
of the following two diagrams in the category of sets:
ΣG × Σ
Y
H
D(Y,ΣG)(unfΣ)
// ΣG × Σ
Y
Gω
ΣH
〈nowH,ltrH〉
OO
unfΣ
// ΣGω
〈now,ltr〉
OO
Y × YH
idY ×(unfY )
// Y × Y ω
YH
〈hdH,tlH〉
OO
unfY
// Y ω
〈hd,tl〉
OO
(1)
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In other words unfΣ and unfY have to be D(Y,ΣG)- and S(Y )-coalgebra
morphisms, respectively, and these are uniquely determined by the fact that
their codomains are the respective final coalgebras.
This means that to show that Gω is a final FG-coalgebra, we have to prove
that the pair of functions 〈unfΣ, unfY 〉 defined via the diagrams in (1) is a
FG-coalgebra morphism. We need several lemmas.
Lemma 11. For every σ ∈ ΣH we have unfY (PH(σ)) = PGω(unfΣ(σ)).
Proof. To see this we define a relation
Q := {(unfY (PH(σ)), PGω(unfΣ(σ))) | σ ∈ ΣH} ⊆ Y
ω × Y ω
and we prove that Q is a S(Y )-bisimulation, i.e., that for each (τ1, τ2) ∈ Q we
have hd(τ1) = hd(τ2) and (tl(τ1), tl(τ2)) ∈ Q. From the coinduction principle
it follows that any two streams related by Q are equal which implies the
lemma. The proof that Q is a bisimulation is contained in the appendix.
We now turn to the verification of the equilibrium condition for (unfΣ, unfY ).
First we use (unfΣ, unfY ) to define an indexed predicate on ΣGω (which can
be thought of as the image of EH under (unfΣ, unfY )). This predicate will be
a post-fixpoint of Φ which will then imply the desired equilibrium condition.
Definition 12. We define an indexed predicate EˆH : (Y
ω → R)→ PΣGω by
putting σ ∈ EˆHk if ∃σ
′ ∈ ΣH s.t. unfΣ(σ
′) = σ and σ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ).
Definition 13. We define a map ( )∗ : (Y ω → R) → (Y × YH → R) by
putting k∗ = λy.λz.k(y :: unfY (z)).
Lemma 14. For k : Y ω → R and σ′ ∈ ΣH, if σ
′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ), then
(i) nowH(σ
′) ∈ EG(λy.k
∗(y, PH(ltrH(σ
′)(y)))), and
(ii) for all y′ ∈ Y we have ltr(σ′)(y′) ∈ EH(λz.k
∗(y′, z)).
Proof. Suppose σ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ). Observe that k ◦ unfY = k
∗ ◦ 〈hdH, tlH〉,
so this is equivalent to σ′ ∈ EH(k
∗ ◦ 〈hdH, tlH〉) and — as 〈hdH, tlH〉 is a
morphism of open games — we obtain 〈nowH, ltrH〉 (σ
′) ∈ EFGH(k
∗). The
lemma now follows by spelling out the definition of EFGH(k
∗).
We are now ready to prove the key fact that EˆH is a post-fixpoint of Φ.
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Lemma 15. Let σ ∈ ΣGω be a strategy such that σ ∈ EˆHk for some k : Y
ω →
R . Then σ ∈ Φ(EˆH)(k).
Proof. The assumption σ ∈ EˆHk means that there is some σ
′ ∈ ΣH such that
unfΣ(σ
′) = σ and σ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ). We need to verify that
(a) now(σ) ∈ EG(λy.k(y :: PGω ltr(σ)(y))), and
(b) for all y′ ∈ Y we have ltr(σ)(y′) ∈ EˆH(λz.k(y
′ :: z)).
For (a), note that by the diagram for strategies in (1) we have now(σ) =
now(unfΣ(σ
′)) = nowH(σ
′). Using the first item of Lemma 14, we obtain
now(σ) ∈ EG(λy.k
∗(y, PH(ltrH(σ
′)(y))))
= EG(λy.k(y :: unfY (PH(ltrH(σ
′)(y)))))
Lemma 11
= EG(λy.k(y :: PGω(unfΣ(ltrH(σ
′)(y)))))
(1)
= EG(λy.k(y :: PGω(ltr(unfΣ(σ
′))(y))))
= EG(λy.k(y :: PGω(ltr(σ)(y))))
which establishes (a).
For (b), it suffices to define for each y′ ∈ Y a suitable strategy σ′y′ ∈
ΣH such that unfΣσ
′
y′ = ltr(σ)(y
′) and σ′y′ ∈ EH(λz.k(y
′ :: unfY z)). We
claim that for an arbitrary y′ ∈ Y the strategy σ′y′ := ltrH(σ
′)(y′) meets
these conditions. The first condition is again an easy consequence of (1)
and the fact that unfΣ(σ
′) = σ. For the second condition we note that
σ′y ∈ EH(λz.k
∗(y′, z)) as a consequence of σ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ) and the second
item of Lemma 14. The claim follows now from σ′y′ ∈ EH(λz.k
∗(y′, z)) =
EH(λz.(y
′ :: unfY (z))).
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 16. Let G : (1, R) → (Y,R) be an open game and let Gω be its
ω-iteration. Then Gω is a final FG-coalgebra.
Proof. By our discussion at the beginning of this subsection it suffices to
show that for an arbitrary FG-coalgebra (H, (〈nowH, ltrH〉 , 〈hdH, tlH〉)) the
map (unfΣ, unfY ) consisting of the coalgebra morphisms in (1) is a morphism
of open games. Lemma 11 shows that (unfΣ, unfY ) satisfies the morphism
condition wrt play functions. For checking the equilibrium condition consider
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an arbitrary σ′ ∈ ΣH and a k : Y
ω → R such that σ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ).
Then clearly we have unfΣ(σ
′) ∈ EˆH(k). As EˆH is a post-fixpoint of Φ
by Lemma 15, we have EˆH(k) ⊆ EGω(k), and thus unfΣ(σ
′) ∈ EGω(k) as
required.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
The main contributions of this paper are on the one hand a notion of
morphism between open games and — based on this notion — the repre-
sentation of the infinite iteration of a given game as a final coalgebra. This
provides a first extension of the compositionality results from Ghani et al.
(2016) to infinitely repeated games. Nevertheless a number of challenges re-
main: firstly, we need to extend our construction to state-full games and to
games with non-trivial coutility function. The former seems straightforward,
at least if we confine ourselves to games that share the same state space X .
Secondly, we need to make the link of our work to subgame-perfect equilibria
more explicit. Finally, after having represented infinitely repeated games as
final coalgebra, we will be able to provide new reasoning tools for such games
based on coinduction and coalgebraic logics.
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Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Prop. 10. The type of α is ok, we need to show that α is a morphism
of open games. Firstly we need to check that α interacts well with the play
functions, i.e., we need to check that for all σ ∈ ΣGω we have 〈hd, tl〉 (PGωσ) =
P(Y→Gω)◦G(〈now, ltr〉 (σ)). This is routine.
Secondly we need to verify that α satisfies the equilibrium condition, i.e.,
we need to check that for all σ ∈ ΣGω and all k : Y × Y
ω → R we have
that if σ ∈ EGω(k ◦ 〈hd, tl〉) then 〈now, ltr〉 (σ) ∈ E(Y→Gω)◦G(k). To see this
consider arbitrary σ and k with σ ∈ EGω(k ◦ 〈hd, tl〉). By Lemma 9 we have
now(σ) ∈ EG(λy.k(y :: PGω ltr(σ)(y))) and ∀y
′ ∈ Y. ltr(σ)(y′) ∈ EGω(λz.k(y
′ ::
z)) which is equivalent to 〈now, ltr〉 (σ) = 〈now(σ), ltr(σ)〉 ∈ E(Y→Gω)◦G(k) as
required.
Proof of Prop. 11. We only show that the relation Q as defined on page 9 is
a bisimulation. To this aim we consider an arbitrary σ ∈ ΣH. We calculate
〈hd, tl〉 (unfY (PH(σ))) = S(Y )(unfY )(〈hdH, tlH〉PH(σ))
= S(Y )(unfY )
(
PFGH(〈nowH, ltrH〉 (σ))
)
= S(Y )(unfY ) (PGnowH(σ) :: PH(ltrH(σ)(PGnowH(σ)))
= 〈PGnowH(σ), unfY (PH(ltrH(σ)(PGnowH(σ)))〉
= 〈PGnow(unfΣ(σ)), unfY (PH(ltrH(σ)(PGnowH(σ))))〉
and
〈hd, tl〉 (PGω(unfΣ(σ)))
Prop. 10
= PFGGω(〈now, ltr〉 (unfΣ(σ)))
Def.
= 〈PGnow(unfΣ(σ)), PGω(ltr(unfΣ(σ)(PGnow(unfΣ(σ))))〉
(1)
= 〈PGnow(unfΣ(σ)), PGω(unfΣ(ltrH(σ)(PGnowH(σ))))〉 .
This implies that hd(unfY (PH(σ))) = hd(PGω(unfΣ(σ))) and that
(tl(unfY (PH(σ))), tl(PGω(unfΣ(σ)))) ∈ Q
as required.
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